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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the banking industry has experienced a
marked trend toward concentration, with a substantial increase
in the number of mergers and acquisitions.' Commentators pro-
ject that this trend will continue for the foreseeable future.2
Although interstate mergers' have resulted in a greater number
of national and super-regional banks,4 the business of banking
1. According to a 1992 Congressional Staff Report, 'The greatest wave of bank
mergers in the history of the United States, both in-market and interstate, is sweep-
ing the banking industry." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND UR-
BAN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., 2D SEss., ANALYSIS OF BANKING INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
ISSUES 1 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter CONSOLIDATION ISSUES]. A Federal Reserve
Board study reports that the number of bank mergers and acquisitions increased
from 144 mergers and acquisitions in 1978 involving $5.5 billion in assets to 710
mergers and acquisitions in 1987 involving $131.4 billion in assets. Bank Mergers:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1991) [hereinafter Bank Merger Hearings] (statement of John
P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). According
to the Board, during the 1980s, there were almost 5000 bank mergers and acquisi-
tions involving almost $650 billion in assets. Id. The average annual rate of bank
mergers and acquisitions for the 1980s was double the rate of the 1970s and triple
the rate for the 1960s. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few To Serve?
The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 961 (1992).
2. Bank Merger Hearings, supra note 1, at 278 (statement of Professor Lawrence
J. White, Stern School of Business, New York University); see also Timothy H.
Hannan & Stephen A. Rhoades, Future U.S. Banking Structure: 1990 to 2010, 37
ANTITRUST BULL. 737, 764-770 (1992). Using current rates of consolidation, Hannan
and Rhoades project that the number of banking organizations may decrease from
9908 in 1989 to as few as 5031 in 2010. Id. at 768.
3. The term "mergers" as used herein refers to all types of mergers, acquisitions,
and consolidations.
4. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions On Bank Consolidation: An Economic
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remains substantially local in nature.' Accordingly, banking
remains a subject of significant state interest and regulation.'
Given the potential impact on local economies resulting from
the consolidation trend,' state attorneys general have become
increasingly active in merger analysis.' Indeed, since 1990,
state attorneys general have matched the United States Depart-
ment of Justice in reported challenges to proposed bank merg-
ers.? Despite the recent success of state attorneys general in
Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1087-88 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D. Wolken, Banking Markets and the
Use of Financial Services by Households, 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 169 (1992) [herein-
after Elliehausen & Wolken, Households] (stating that consumers cluster their pur-
chases of banking products at local institutions); Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D.
Wolken, Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services by Small and Medium-
Sized Businesses, 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 801 (1990) [hereinafter Elliehausen &
Wolken, Small Businesses] (stating that empirical evidence suggests that small busi-
nesses generally conduct their banking within a five mile radius); Hannan &
Rhoades, supra note 2, at 744-45; see also infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
8. Bank Merger Experts Offer Tips on Murky Scene for Acquisitions, 65 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629 at 294 (Aug. 26, 1993) (comments of Charles
James, former Acting Chief, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice,
to the American Bar Association).
9. The antitrust enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice
during the 1980s has been criticized as lax. See, e.g., Antitrust Implications of Bank
Mergers and the Role of Several States in Evaluating Recent Mergers: Hearings Be-
fore the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1992) [hereinafter Antitrust Implications] (statement of Rep. Gonzalez, Committee
Chairman); SOUTHERN FINANCE PROJECT, THE BIGGER THEY COME: MEGAMERGERS
AND THEIR IMPACT ON BANKING MARKETS 2 (1991) [hereinafter THE BIGGER THEY
COME]. Between fiscal years 1986 and 1990, the United States Department of Jus-
tice did not file a single antitrust suit related to a combination of depository institu-
tions, despite reviewing over 9000 bank merger applications during that time period.
Id. at 8. Since 1990, the Department of Justice has become much more aggressive,
successfully challenging five proposed bank mergers. See United States v. Texas
Commerce Bancshares, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T1 70,326 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (Texas
Commerce Bancshares' merger with Texas Commerce Bank, Midland, N.A. and Texas
Commerce Bank, Beaumont, N.A.); United States v. Texas Commerce Bancshares,
1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) J1 70,363 (N.D. Tex 1993) (same); United States v. Society
Corp., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,892 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (Society Coip.'s merger
with Ameritrust Corp.); United States v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 1991-2 Trade Cas.
(CCI) 9 69,646 (D. Me. 1991) (Fleet/Norstar's merger with New Maine National
Bank); BankAmerica Corp. 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 338 (1992) (BankAmerica's merg-
er with Security Pacific); United States v. First Hawaiian, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) % 69,457 (D. Haw. 1991) (First Hawaiian, Inc.'s merger with First Interstate
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challenging anticompetitive bank mergers, or perhaps because of
it, the legitimacy of their activities in this area has been ques-
tioned publicly. ° Opponents contend that the proper role for
state law enforcement is one of participation within the federally
initiated merger review process. They argue that passage of the
federal laws governing bank mergers altered the applicability of
the Clayton Act in favor of a uniform system of merger review
governed by federal banking regulators."
According to this argument, neither the Bank Merger Act 2
(BMA), nor the Bank Holding Company Act 3 (BHCA), confers a
private right of action on individuals or state enforcement offi-
cials. Instead, state attorneys general are limited to administra-
tive challenges to the completed review process in federal
court. 4
In addition, critics question the validity of applying state
antitrust provisions to bank mergers. Under this argument,
state law is preempted by both the statutory language of the
of Hawaii, Inc.).
Partially in response to the lax federal regulation in the 1980s, state attorneys
general significantly increased their enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws.
Lloyd Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 163 (1990); Ralph H.
Folsom, State Antitrust Remedies: Lessons from the Laboratories, 35 ANTITRUST BULL.
941, 954-55 (1985); Stanley M. Lipnick & Janis M. Gibbs, An Overview of the Last
Decade of State Antitrust Law, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 929, 930 (1985). Since 1990, state
attorneys general have successfully challenged five proposed bank mergers. See
BankAmerica, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 338 (1992) (Washington, California, and Arizona
challenging merger of BankAmerica and Security Pacific); Fleet Bank of Maine, 77
FED. RES. BULL. 750, 752 (1991) (Maine challenging Fleet/Norstar's merger with New
Maine National Bank. For a discussion of Maine's challenge to this merger, see
Antitrust Implications, supra, at 8-9.); Maine v. Key Bank, 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
91 69,649 (D. Me. 1991) (Maine challenging Key Bank of Maine's merger with Casco
Northern Bank, N.A.); First Bank Sys., Inc., 79 FED. RES. BULL. 50 (1993) (Minneso-
ta challenging merger of First Bank Systems, Inc. and Bank Shares, Inc.); Bank
Acquisitions-New York, 258 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 5 (1993) (New York challenging
Fleet Bank of New York's acquisition of 32 branches of Chemical Bank).
10. See, e.g., Peter E. Greene & Gary A. MacDonald, The Jurisdiction of State At-
torneys General To Challenge Bank Mergers Under the Antitrust Laws. 110 BANKING
L.J. 500 (1993); Robert B. Cox, 1st Bank Cuts Size of Deal as Antitrust Issue Lin-
gers, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 1992, at 15.
11. Greene & MacDonald, supra note 10, at 514-15.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988).
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1849, 1850, 1971-1978 (1988).
14. Greene & MacDonald, supra note 10, at 502.
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BHCA and the complete occupation of the field by the regula-
tions of federal banking agencies. 5 To date, no court has direct-
ly addressed these arguments.
In Part II below, this Article concludes that state attorneys
general may legitimately analyze and challenge proposed
anticompetitive bank mergers. As a matter of fundamental pub-
lic policy, states historically have sought to protect competition
and local economies by enforcing state and federal antitrust
laws. Federal courts have consistently upheld this enforcement
policy, rejecting Supremacy Clause" challenges. Because bank-
ing is an integral part of a state's economy, the same public
policy requires state intervention when proposed bank mergers
appear anticompetitive. Moreover, federal regulation of banking
through the BMA and the BHCA neither preempts state anti-
trust law nor removes state attorneys general parens patriae
standing to enforce federal antitrust law. To the contrary, these
two laws create new opportunities and enhanced remedies for
attorneys general who represent the interests of the states in
federal forums.
II. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL MAY CHALLENGE
ANTICOMPETITIVE BANK MERGERS
A. State Attorney General Antitrust Enforcement
For over one-hundred years, states have been enforcing laws
designed to protect competition." For individual states, compe-
tition is vital to their local economies, and protecting competi-
tion is a public policy of the first magnitude.'" Federal courts
15. Id. at 514-16.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the United States Constitution and
laws pursuant to it are "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the L'5ws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
17. See James May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman
Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93 (1990);
Folsom, supra note 9, at 942-43.
18. See, e.g., Columbia Gas v. New York State Elec. & Gas, 268 N.E.2d 790 (N.Y.
1971). According to New York's highest court, the state's antitrust statute, the
Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340, reflects a "strong public policy in favor of
free competition for New York and represents a public policy of the first magnitude."
1994]
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have respected and supported this public policy and have re-
jected Supremacy Clause attacks on state antitrust laws.' 9 The
federal courts, as well as the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government, also have fostered the enforcement of
federal antitrust laws by state attorneys general.2 ° In addition
to challenges to bank mergers, states have effectively used state
and federal antitrust laws to challenge proposed anticompetitive
mergers in such diverse areas as manufacturing, processing, dis-
tribution, and retailing."
1. State Antitrust Laws Are Presumed Valid Against
Supremacy Clause Challenges
The first antitrust law of general application was not the
Sherman Act,2 but a state statute passed in Kansas in 1889.23
Indeed, at least twelve states had various forms of antitrust
legislation before Congress approved the Sherman Act in
1890.4 States were very active in the early years of antitrust
enforcement, 2 and fundamental policies of federal antitrust
law, such as the per se rule against price fixing, were based, at
least in part, on principles developed in state courts enforcing
state antitrust laws.26
Columbia Gas, 268 N.E.2d at 796; see also Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 420
F. Supp. 82, 89 (D. Md. 1976), affd 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977) (observing that
"[tihe economy of a state ... is certainly one of the major concerns of state govern-
ment" and that this interest is "only slightly less urgent than public health and
safety" in the eyes of a state).
19. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
22. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
23. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389 (current version at
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50.112-.120 (1983 & Supp. 1993)).
24. See David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 141
(1990); Stephen Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
653, 657 (1974). By 1890, an additional fourteen states had adopted constitutional
provisions prohibiting monopolies, trusts and similar anticompetitive conduct. See
James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era, The Constitution-
al and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law: 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495
(1987); William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23
U. CHi. L. REV. 221 (1954).
25. May, supra note 17, at 98.
26. See United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In Trenton Potter-
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While enforcement of antitrust laws in many states became
dormant after the early 1900s,2 the late 1970s and the early
1980s witnessed a substantial revitalization of state antitrust
power.28 During this period, many states passed new antitrust
laws or amended existing ones. At present, Pennsylvania and
Vermont are the only states without antitrust statutes of gener-
al application."0
Renewed and invigorated antitrust enforcement efforts by the
states generated debate over whether state antitrust enforce-
ment violated principles of federalism.8 ' However, the United
ies, the Court, partially relying on prior state case law, held that price fixing among
competitors was illegal without regard to the reasonableness of the price. Id. at 400.
Senator Sherman saw federal antitrust law as a complimentary supplement to exist-
ing state antitrust law, not a replacement. 21 CONG. REC. 2456, 2457 (1890) (state-
ment of Sen. Sherman).
27. See May, supra note 17, at 97 (describing the "comparatively quiescent period"
of antitrust enforcement from the close of the First World War to the 1970s).
28. Id. at 99.
29. Since 1970, nine states have adopted new antitrust laws: ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.562-.596 (1986 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4 (1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 35-24-45 (1987 & Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2101-2114 (1993);
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 11-201 to -213 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.010-
280 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.17
(Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-18-1 to -23 (1992).
30. Vermont has a "Little FTC Act," VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (1993), that
prohibits unfair methods of competition, comparable with § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See State v. Heritage Realty, 407 A.2d 509
(Vt. 1979). Seventeen other states have adopted statutes with prohibitions compa-
rable to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1986);
CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42-110(b) (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 510.204 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §
480-2 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740 para. 10/1-14 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (West
1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1602 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.5 (1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-1-23 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
100.20 (West 1988).
Pennsylvania has an Antibid-Rigging Act that applies to government contracts
and subcontracts and provides for civil penalties, criminal penalties, government
recovery of treble damages, and suspension or disbarment sanctions. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73 §§ 1611-1620 (1993).
31. See, e.g., Lloyd Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 163
(1989); Malcolm R. Pfunder, Constitutional Limitations on State Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (1989); Daniel Oliver, Federal and State Antitrust En-
forcement: Constitutional Principles and Policy Considerations, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
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States Supreme Court, which showed increased reluctance to
preempt state laws, generally supported increased activism by
states on a variety of legal fronts in the 1970s and 1980s.
Concepts of states' rights and federalism espoused by the Su-
preme Court, beginning with the Burger Court, were charac-
terized by a strong presumption that state law was valid against
Supremacy Clause attacks."
In preemption challenges over the years, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly shown its reluctance to preempt state antitrust
laws.34 Most recently, the Court reestablished its support for
state antitrust enforcement in California v. ARC America
Corp.3" In ARC America, the states of Alabama, Arizona, Cali-
fornia and Minnesota sought damages for price fixing as indirect
purchasers of concrete block. 6 Because federal antitrust law
prohibits indirect purchasers from collecting damages, the states
sought damages under their own state antitrust laws. The
defendants argued that the federal antitrust rule against indi-
1245 (1988).
32. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspec-
tives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) (describing
the Court's "considerable receptivity to maintaining the diversity of state and local
institutions and interests").
33. See Hillsborough v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985)
(upholding local regulation of blood plasma centers, in part due to the presumption
that local regulation can constitutionally co-exist with federal regulation).
34. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403-04 (1941). According to the Court,
"nothing either in the language of the [Federal] copyright laws or in the history of
their enactment ... indicate[s] any congressional purpose to deprive the states,
either in whole or in part, of their long-recognized power to regulate combinations in
restraint of trade." Id. at 404; see also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 259-
60, 263 (1937) (holding that the Sherman Act does not preempt Puerto Rico's anti-
trust statute); cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (hold-
ing that a Maryland statute regulating price reductions made by petroleum produc-
ers to retail gas stations was not preempted by the Sherman Act or the Robinson
Patman Act).
35. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
36. Id. at 97. Indirect purchasers do not deal directly with price fixers or others
who engage in anticompetitive activity but are injured when the costs of the illegal
activity are passed down the distribution chain. See Elmer J. Schaeffer, Passing-on
Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16
WM. & MARY L, REv. 883, 914 (1975) (explaining that indirect purchasers have a
greater incentive to bring suit because they cannot pass on price increases).
37. ARC Am. Corp. 490 U.S. at 97-98.
102
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rect purchaser claims preempted state antitrust law.35 A
unanimous Supreme Court ruled in favor of state enforce-
ment." The Court reaffirmed the strong presumption against
finding preemption of state law in areas traditionally regulated
by the states." Recognizing "the long history of state common-
law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair busi-
ness practices,"4' the Court concluded that Congress had not
preempted the field of antitrust law.42 Accordingly, the Court
held that state antitrust remedies remain valid, even where
"they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal
law."43
2. State Attorneys General May Use Federal Antitrust Laws
To Enforce Public Policy
State attorneys general are not limited to enforcing only state
antitrust laws when faced with anticompetitive conduct impact-
ing their states; rather, they have parens patriae standing to
enforce federal antitrust laws. Parens patriae gained acceptance
early as a basis for antitrust suits by state attorneys general."
38. Id. at 102.
39. Id. at 105.
40. Id. at 101.
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 105; see also Texas v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 697 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1029 (1986). Texas challenged acquisition of
assets by Coca-Cola from Dr. Pepper under state antitrust law. Id. at 678. Texas'
intermediate appellate court ruled that there is no preemption and no conflict be-
tween state and federal antitrust law. Id. at 680.
44. In general, to maintain an action parens patriae, "the State must articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be
more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest." Al-
fred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). This interest can
fall into two categories. "First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in general. Second, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful
status within the federal system." Id. at 607.
In establishing the interest in the health and well-being of its citizens, the state
must allege more than injury to an identifiable group. Id. at 607. "[T]he indirect
effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining whether the State
has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population." Id. Al-
though the limits are not clear, Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1209 (11th
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In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.," Georgia brought an antitrust
suit in its quasi-sovereign capacity as protector of its people
against injury.46 The State alleged a price fixing conspiracy
among a large number of railroad companies" and that this
conspiracy injured its general economy.48 The Court recognized
that a state, in its parens patriae role, may bring a civil suit un-
der federal antitrust laws, and that such a suit is not limited to
protecting the state's proprietary interests.49 The Court found
that the alleged price fixing conspiracy could stifle old indus-
tries, impede the establishment of new ones, arrest development
of the state, and put the state at a disadvantage in competitive
markets." The Court held that these potential economic set-
backs were of "grave public concern " " and were the type of in-
jury that clearly gave the state standing under the antitrust
laws.2 Lower courts consistently apply the principles articulat-
ed in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. and grant states standing
Cir. 1989), a state generally does not have standing as parens patriae to sue the
federal government. Snapp & Sons, 458 U.S. at 610, n.16.
45. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
46. Id. at 443.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 444.
49. Id. at 447. The Court did not consider whether § 4 of the Clayton Act autho-
rizes damages for an injury to a state's general economy. The Supreme Court an-
swered this question in the negative in Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
Hawaii alleged that four oil companies violated § 1 of the Sherman Act "by entering
into unlawful contracts; by conspiring and combining to restrain trade and commerce
in the sale, marketing, and distribution of refined petroleum products; and by at-
tempting to monopolize and actually monopolizing trade and commerce." Id. at 253
(footnote omitted). The Court distinguished between damages relief under § 4 and
injunctive relief under § 16 and agreed that the state had the right to sue as pa-
rens patriae for injunctive relief against injury to the state's general economy, Id. at
261-62, but could not recover damages, as parens patriae, for such an injury. Id. at
262-64. The state could only recover damages in its proprietary capacity for injury to
its "business or property," which the Court interpreted to mean the state's commer-
cial interests or enterprises. Id. at 264. The Ninth Circuit extended this reasoning
by ruling that a state, as parens patriae, cannot recover damages on behalf of its
citizens for injuries sustained through violations of federal antitrust laws, California
v. Frito-Lay, 474 F.2d 774, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), but
invited Congress to correct this situation through legislation. Id. at 777. Congress
accepted this invitation. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
50. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. at 450.
51. Id. at 449.
52. Id. at 450.
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under federal law to challenge anticompetitive conduct affecting
their economy or people.5 3
Congress and the Executive Branch also support the enforce-
ment of federal antitrust laws by state attorneys general.54 For
example, by passing Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1976"5 (Rodino Act), Congress formally cod-
53. With respect to injunctions, "[aillegations of injury to the general economy of
the State ... are sufficient to confer standing upon the [State] Attorney Gener-
al . .. in a parens patriae capacity where the Attorney General seeks to sue on
behalf of the citizens of [the state]. . . ." Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 554
F.2d 633, 634-35 (4th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); see Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 592; People v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing Snapp & Sons in dicta); see also In re Montgomery County Real Estate, 452
F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Md. 1978) ("Congress intended to allow state attorneys general
to sue on behalf of the state's injured consumer regardless of the existence or non-
existence of injury to the general economy."). See generally Pennsylvania v. Mid-At-
lantic Toyota Dist., 704 F.2d 125, 131 n.13 (4th Cir. 1983) ("A state may well have
a 'public interest' in maintaining an action without having a 'quasi-sovereign' inter-
est sufficient to support original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.").
Most recently, a federal district court rejected a challenge to a state's parens
patriae standing in an antitrust challenge to a proposed merger. Pennsylvania v.
Russell Stover Candies, 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 70,224 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
defendants read Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), to overrule
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. as it applies to state parens patriae actions seeking an
injunction under federal antitrust laws. Russell Stover, 1993-1 Trade Cas. at %
70,088. They claimed that it would be "anomalous" to allow the state to seek an
injunction to prevent harm when it could not recover damages if the threatened
injury to its general economy happened. Id. The district court rejected this argument
for a number of reasons. First, the question of parens patriae was not before the
Court in Cargill. Id. % 70,089. Second, Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251 (1972),
upon which the defendants also relied, "did not suggest that [the] lack of availability
of damages affected the availability of injunctive relief." Russell Stover, 1993-1 Trade
Cas. at % 70,089 (citing Standard Oil). Finally, and most importantly, the court rec-
ognized that:
The contours of antitrust standing as it relates to a state in its parens
patriae capacity are perhaps different from antitrust standing as it ap-
plies to other private parties. Precedent involving standing of individual
private parties may not control the issue of parens patriae standing as
those cases do not implicate quasi-sovereign interests. Although the state
is considered a private party, to some extent, when it brings an action
parens patriae, [there are] possible nuances between an individual and a
state which are relevant to the issue of antitrust standing.
Id.
54. See Folsom, supra note 9, at 951-53.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1988). This Act reads in part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
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ified the states' ability to bring Sherman antitrust suits as pa-
rens patriae.56 Other legislative actions provided grants to state
attorneys general to develop antitrust expertise57 and enhanced
the states' ability to collect civil damages following federal crimi-
nal convictions under the Sherman Act.5" The Executive Branch
has supported state attorneys general in antitrust enforcement
through a "web of interdependent projects" encompassing an
"extraordinary range of activities" including information sharing,
cross-designation of assistant attorneys general, joint investiga-
tions, coordinated litigation, and amicus curiae support."
3. State Attorneys General Have Standing To Challenge
Anticompetitive Mergers
States have used their authority to bring antitrust actions
under state and federal law to challenge proposed mergers with
anticompetitive consequences. Some states have statutes specifi-
cally prohibiting anticompetitive mergers" and have used these
such State, in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section for
injury sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason of
any violation of sections 1 to 7 of this title.
Id.
56. The House of Representatives, in its report on its version of the bill, stated
that "[tihe parens patriae doctrine already applies to antitrust injunction cases. [This
bill] extends the doctrine to permit States to protect their citizens by suing for dam-
ages when they are injured by antitrust violations." H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2578.
57. Act of Oct. 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2407, 2415 (this sec-
tion was omitted on renewal, Act of Dec. 27, 1979 Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat.
1179); see Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems with Putting
New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 591-594 (1979) (discussing the
procedure of implementing grants and their state by state effects on antitrust
enforement budgets).
58. Section 4F of the Clayton Act, adopted in 1976, requires the United States
Department of Justice to share its investigative files with state attorneys general. 15
U.S.C. § 15f(b). In 1980, Congress amended § 5(a) of the Clayton Act specifically to
allow parties seeking federal antitrust damages to argue that a conclusive presump-
tion of a violation follows a final Justice Department judgement or decree. 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a).
59. 60 Minutes With Robert M. Langer, Chair, National Association of Attorneys
General Multistate Antitrust Task Force, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 212 (1991).
60. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.566 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-7 (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102-A (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-13 (1972);
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state antitrust laws to challenge such mergers."' The states
have repeatedly used their parens patriae enforcement authority
to oppose anticompetitive mergers.62 Recently, in California v.
American Stores,63 the United States Supreme Court approved
the states' right to seek divestiture under section 16 of the Clay-
ton Act' as a proper form of injunctive relief. In addition to ac-
tions by individual states, state attorneys general coordinate
activities through the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG).65 NAAG has promulgated Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines,66 and the state attorneys general have entered into a
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1606 (1988); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-4.c (1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1331.02 (Baldwin 1988); TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(d)
(West 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.060 (West 1989). Prior to 1968, the
Oklahoma Constitution contained an antimerger provision comparable to § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 41 (1961). The Oklahoma
Constitution was amended in 1968 to limit the application of § 41 to the business of
banking. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STAT-
UTES § 38-12 (1990). The territory of Puerto Rico also has a statute comparable to
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. See P.R. LAwS ANN. tit. 10, § 261 (1976). Moreover, because
§ 1 of the Sherman Act also prohibits anticompetitive mergers, states with § 1
analogs may also be able to challenge anticompetitive mergers under state law. See
United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 671-672 (1964);
Folsom, supra note 9, at 969. But see California em rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco,
Inc., 762 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1988) (holding that state antitrust statute does not apply to
mergers).
61. See, e.g., Massachusetts, Maine & New Hampshire v. Campeau Corp., 1988-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,093 (D. Mass. 1988); Texas v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 697
S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1029 (1986); see also
Canadian Based Firm Resolves Maine's Concerns About Merger, 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1384 at 524 (1988).
62. California v. American Stores, 495 U.S. 271 (1990); Washington v. Texaco
Mktg. & Ref., Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,345 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Connecti-
cut ex- rel. Riddle v. Wyco New Haven, Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,024 (D.
Conn. 1990); City of Pittsburgh v. May Dep't Stores, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,304 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
63. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
65. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
POWERS & RESPONSIBILITIES 233-36 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990). NAAG's standing
Antitrust Committee is comprised of seven attorneys general. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT i
(1989). NAAG's Antitrust Taskforce is composed of the chief antitrust attorney from
each state attorney general's office. Id. The Taskforce coordinates multistace antitrust
investigation, litigation, and amicus curiae briefs. Id. The taskforce also develops
proposed legislation, legislative commentary and policy positions for the NAAG Anti-
trust Committee and for NAAG as a whole. Id.
66. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General
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compact to receive and share premerger data provided volun-
tarily by companies contemplating mergers."
B. Public Policy and Federalism in State Bank Merger Analysis
The public policy articulated above, which encourages state
intervention to prevent anticompetitive conduct that adversely
affects a state's economy or people, is particularly applicable to
anticompetitive bank mergers. Economic research consistently
demonstrates that the most significant impact of banking activi-
ties is on local communities.68 Additionally, concepts of federal-
ism support state intervention to oppose anticompetitive bank
mergers.69
1. Bank Mergers and State Economies
According to the Supreme Court, a proposed merger will be
considered anticompetitive if the merger may substantially less-
en competition "in any line of commerce in any section of the
country." ° In 1963, the Court held in United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank71 that the impact of mergers in the "line of
commerce" known as commercial banking,72 was essentially
64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1608 Special Supp. at 357 (April 1,
1993).
67. NAAG's Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1345 at 943 (1987).
68. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
70. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963) (quoting
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18). According to the Court:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the con-
centration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen com-
petition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.
Id. at 363.
71. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
72. In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court held that the "cluster of products"
offered by commercial banks was unique and, therefore, constituted "a distinct line
of commerce." Id. at 356. Because of changes in banking regulations and practices,
some commentators have challenged this definition. See, e.g., Note, The Line of Com-
merce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 907 (1983); William F. Jung, Note, Banking Mergers and "Lin, Of Commerce"
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local in nature." Since Philadelphia National Bank, economic
studies have repeatedly confirmed that the business of banking
remains local in nature. 4 For example, a 1990 study by Grego-
ry E. Elliehausen and John D. Wolken, economists for the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, confirms the con-
clusion of the Supreme Court in Philadelphia National Bank
that local commercial banks were the primary source of financial
products and services for small and medium sized businesses. 5
Despite the significant changes that have occurred in financial
services markets since 1963,76 Elliehausen and Wolken found
After the Monetary Control Act: A Submarket Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 731;
Lee B. David, Comment, Banking-Mergers-Is Commercial Banking Still a Distinct
Line of Commerce?, 57 TUL. L. REv. 958 (1983). However, recent empirical research
indicates that many banking customers still cluster their purchases of banking prod-
ucts and services. See, e.g., Elliehausen & Wolken, Small Businesses, supra note 5,
at 180 (observing that small and medium sized businesses cluster their purchases of
financial products and services at local commercial banks); Elliehausen & Wolken,
Households, supra note 5, at 180 (noting that consumers cluster their purchases of
banking products at local institutions); Hannan & Rhoades, supra note 2, at 744-45.
Federal courts reject a submarket approach and adhere to commercial banking as
the appropriate product market when analyzing bank mergers. See United States v.
Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).
73. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 358-60. According to the Court, when
determining the appropriate section of the country, the "proper question to be
asked . .. is not where the parties to the merger do business or even where they
compete, but where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger
on competition will be direct and immediate." Id. at 357. The Court noted that in
banking, convenience of location was essential to effective competition. Id. at 358.
Accordingly, the Court found that individuals and corporations conferred the bulk of
their patronage on banks in their local communities. Id. Since Philadelphia National
Bank, federal courts have been concerned primarily with the potential
anticompetitive effects of proposed bank mergers on local communities, See, e.g.,
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 362-65 (1970); United States
v. County Nat'l Bank of Bennington, 339 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Vt. 1972); Washington
Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 347 F. Supp. 790, 798 (W.D. Wash. 1972). Individuals and
businesses typically do most of their business with banks in their local community
because it is impractical to work at a distance. Id.; see also discussion infra notes
74-80 and accompanying text. Small depositors and borrowers, especially small busi-
nesses, therefore often rely upon local banks for banking services. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 321 U.S. at 359 n.36, 369; see Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. at 363-64;
County Nat'l Bank, 339 F. Supp. at 89.
74. See, e.g., Stephen A. Rhoades, Local vs. National Banking Markets: Evidence
From an Analysis of Mortgage Loan Rates in 20 Cities, Mimeo (Board of Governors
of The Federal Reserve System, 1991). See generally Elliehausen & Wolken, Small
Businesses, supra note 5; Elliehausen & Wolken, Households, supra note 5.
75. Elliehausen & Wolken, Small Businesses, supra note 5, at 815.
76. Since the 1963 decision in Philadelphia National Bank, substantial changes
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that "[flirms use local suppliers to a remarkable extent."" For
small and medium sized businesses, "local commercial banks are
the dominant suppliers of virtually every financial service con-
sidered.""8
In 1992, Elliehausen and Wolken tested whether Philadelphia
National Bank's conclusions regarding local markets were appli-
cable to consumers and reached similar results.79 According to
the authors, "[1]ocal depository institutions, especially local com-
mercial banks, are still the main suppliers for most of the finan-
cial services used by households.""
As a result of localized demand, banking institutions are able
to discriminate between local communities when setting their
fees on products such as mortgage loans, based at least in part
on the level of local competition." Studies also show that banks
in concentrated markets may extract excess profits82 through
higher interest rates on loans, 3 less favorable loan terms and
conditions to borrowers, 4 and lower interest payments on de-
posits.85 Accordingly, bank mergers that substantially increase
concentration in local markets could have significant impact on
have occurred in the banking industry. These changes include the emergence of (1)
more nationwide lending institutions, (2) regional and national electronic banking
services such as telephone banking and ATMs, and (3) national markets for loans
originated by local institutions. See Rhoades, supra note 74, at 2-3. These changes
sparked questions as to the validity of the Supreme Court's characterization of bank-
ing as local in nature. See id. Recent economic studies, however, affirm the continu-
ing vitality of the Supreme Court's conclusions. See infra notes 77-80 and accompa-
nying text.
77. Elliehausen & Wolken, Small Businesses, supra note 5, at 810.
78. Id. at 808.
79. Elliehausen & Wolken, Households, supra note 5, at 180.
80. Id.
81. Rhoades, supra note 74.
82. See Allan N. Berger & Timothy H. Hannon, The Price-Concentration Relation-
ship in Banking, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 291, 291 (1989).
83. Timothy H. Hannon, The Functional Relationship Between Prices and Market
Concentration: The Case of the Banking Industry, in EMPIcAL STUDIEs IN INDUSTRI-
AL ORGANIZATION, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEONARD WEISS 35 (David B. Audretsix &
John J. Siegfield eds., 1992); Timothy H. Hannon, Bank Commercial Loan Markets
and the Role of Market Structure: Evidence from Surveys of Commercial Lending, 15
J. BANKING & FIN. 133-49 (1991); Rhoades, supra note 74, at 15.
84. Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1113-14 (1979).
85. Berger & Hannon, supra note 82, at 298-299.
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local economies.
Moreover, the combined impact of increased concentration in
several individual local banking markets may have statewide
implications. For example, banking in California is dominated
by only a few banks such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and
First Interstate."5 California banks pay interest rates on trans-
action account deposits that are substantially lower than both
the national average and the average in metropolitan areas
outside California." California banks also charge interest rates
on loans that are significantly higher than the national average
and rates charged by banks in out-of-state areas.88 This dispari-
ty has been attributed to highly concentrated and less competi-
tive banking markets.8 9
Mergers may also adversely impact state economies by allow-
ing national and regional banks to drain funds from local com-
munities to support nonlocal lending. Research indicates that
in the 1980s, Texas banks withdrew funds from local communi-
ties to fund projects elsewhere.9' Also, a congressional study of
the fifteen largest financial institutions in the United States
that have satellite operations in other states reported that forty
percent of the satellite operations drained funds from their host
state. 92
When increased concentration in local markets permits banks
to extract higher interest rates on loans, impose less favorable
terms on borrowers, pay less interest on deposits, and drain
funds from local economies, the effects will be at least as harm-
ful as the increased railroad rates addressed by the Supreme
86. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1022-23 n.307; see also Randall J. Pozdena,
Structure and Performance, Some Evidence from California Banking, ECON. REV. 5
(Winter 1986).
87. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1022.
88. Id.
89. Pozdena, supra note 86, at 14-15.
90. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1044-48.
91. Id.; PETER S. ROSE, THE INTERSTATE BANKING REVOLUTION 184 (1989) ("In
order to shore up their lead money-center banks, some holding companies in the
Southwest found themselves borrowing huge amounts from their smaller affiliated
banks in satellite communities.").
92. CONSOLIDATION ISSUES, supra note 1, at 6.
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Court in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. :3
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of
Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have suffered serious-
ly as the result of this alleged conspiracy. Discriminatory
[higher local] rates are but one form of trade barriers. They
may cause a blight no less serious than the spread of noxious
gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the streams.
They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as
profoundly as any diversion of waters from the rivers. They
may stifle, impede, or cripple old industries and prevent the
establishment of new ones. They may arrest the development
of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive
markets.94
Public policy, therefore, demands that states be permitted to
use state and federal antitrust laws to challenge bank mergers
which substantially increase concentration. Modern concepts of
federalism are well served by this public policy.
2. State Antitrust Enforcement and Federalism
American federalism embodies more than a redundant system
of state and federal law enforcement.95 It involves a system of
vertical checks and balances between state and federal govern-
ment that is as vital to our political system as the horizontal
system of checks and balances between the three branches of the
federal government. 6 Commentators have noted that the feder-
al government cannot be relied upon to uniformly enforce anti-
trust laws.97 Over time, federal antitrust enforcement swings
between generally liberal and generally conservative policies,
depending largely upon the economic philosophy of the White
House. These enforcement swings are obvious even when com-
93. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
94. Id. at 450; see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
95. Lloyd Constantine, The Mission and Agenda for State Antitrust Enforcement,
36 ANTITRUsT BULL. 835, 838 (1991).
96. Id. at 838-39.
97. Id. at 839; John Kincaid, Commentary: State Antitrust Law in the Context of a
New Intergovernmental and International Environment, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 188, 190-
91 (1990).
98. Kincaid, supra note 97, at 190-91.
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paring the antitrust enforcement activities of the two recent
Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush.9 Moreover, at
any given time, the federal government may not be capable of
enforcing antitrust laws evenly throughout the states.00 Ac-
tive, competent state enforcement of antitrust laws fulfills a
vital role within the federal system of ensuring the uniform
application of the law over time and place. 1
Congress has recognized the need to supplement federal anti-
trust enforcement. It adopted the private right of action embod-
ied in section 16 of the Clayton Act in large part because of its
dissatisfaction with the results of early merger enforcement
activities of the federal government under the Sherman Act."2
The funding of state antitrust enforcement by Congress, along
with other cooperative federal-state efforts, also reflects the need
for state antitrust enforcement as an integral part of the federal
system. 1o3
With respect to bank mergers, congressional leaders have
explicitly approved state enforcement of federal antitrust laws as
an important tool for ensuring the fulfillment of congressional
intent.' Recently, the House Banking Committee convened
hearings as a result of congressional dissatisfaction with the
failure of federal authorities to challenge anticompetitive bank
mergers.' 5 At those hearings, Congressman Henry Gonzalez,
Chairman of the committee, questioned Carol Smith, chief of the
antitrust division in the State of Washington:
THE CHAIRMAN. Well, what do you think can be done on
our level to make the [Board of Governors of the] Federal
Reserve a little more responsive and do more than just what
I described as rubber stamping [approval of bank mergers]?
We are asking for your opinion because, clearly, we are in
99. Id.; see also supra note 9.
100. See Kincaid, supra note 97, at 191-92.
101. Constantine, supra note 95, at 840; Kincaid, supra note 97, at 190-92.
102. See California v. American Stores, 495 U.S. 271, 285-89 (1990); 33 CONG. REC.
app. at 329-30 (1900) (statement of Rep. Clayton); EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 996 (1978).
103. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1988).
105. Antitrust Implications, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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need of some guidance here, and if you have any suggestions
we would like to hear them.
MS. SMITH. I don't personally have any specific suggestions.
I guess all I can say is that to the extent that the Federal
Reserve Board does not take the competitive aspects of an
acquisition into account, the States will do so.
THE CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, that is the good news.'
Moreover, state attorneys general are uniquely qualified to
fulfill the congressional purposes behind the federal antitrust
laws. Two of the main purposes of federal antitrust laws are the
protection of consumers' and the protection of small business-
es.' State attorneys general have been referred to as the
106. Id. at 13.
107. The protection of consumers is an important goal of the antitrust laws' prohi-
bitions on anticompetitive behavior. See H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 56, at 4,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2573 ("Although the antitrust laws have the im-
mediate goals of protecting and promoting competition, it is the consuming public
that ultimately benefits from the enforcement of the antitrust laws."); Conference of
Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
919 (1952). With respect to mergers, the goal of slowing the trend toward more
concentration was to preserve consumer choice. United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964) (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963)). By preventing anticompetitive actions, Congress and the
courts intend to protect small businesses and consumers from a lack of choice in
product and price. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Sunbury, 311 F. Supp.
374, 378 (M.D. Pa. 1970) ("The intent of the Congress in its enactment of the Clay-
ton Act was for the protection of the small businessman and the consumer through
the arrest of mergers which may have a potentially anti-competitive effect.").
108. One major goal underlying the procompetitive design of federal antitrust law
is a wide dispersal of economic power. Mercantile Tex Corp. v. Board of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1271 (5th Cir. 1981); see United States v. Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274-78 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963). Consumers and small businesses are two of the most important
groups that antitrust policy is intended to protect. The vitality of small businesses is
crucial to this policy. Accordingly, the primary aim of the Celler-Kefauver Act, Anti-
Merger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18,
21 (1988)), was to "aid in preserving small business as an important competitive fac-
tor in the American economy" by dealing with monopolistic tendencies in their incipi-
ency before Sherman Act proceedings become necessary. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4295. The courts have re-
peatedly supported this goal. See, e.g., Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 277 (stating that
"Congress sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by arresting
a trend toward concentration in its incipiency"); John Wright & Assocs. v. Ullrich,
328 F.2d 474, 480 (8th Cir. 1964) (stating that "[tihe very raison d'etre of the
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"people's lawyers" because the vast majority are popularly elect-
ed by the citizens of their states.0 9 The responsiveness and
proximity of state attorneys general to the people and businesses
located within their states place them in a unique position to
assess the actual workings of the marketplace and the needs of
the people, thereby enabling them to fulfill the purposes behind
the antitrust laws."0 When analyzing bank mergers, this prox-
imity gives state attorneys general a distinct advantage over
federal banking and antitrust enforcement agencies."'
Finally, in passing federal antitrust laws Congress only -in-
tended to supplement state antitrust enforcement."' Because
protecting local and state economies is of significant importance
to the states, and because federal officials may not uniformly
enforce federal antitrust laws, state attorneys general must be
free to enforce state antitrust laws as a fundamental principle of
federalism."' Likewise, Congress has repeatedly recognized
the need for a dual state-federal banking system and the equally
important need for the states to play a role in protecting the
integrity of this system."' The BMA and the BHCA and their
legislative histories suggest that Congress intended to continue
this significant feature of our federal system."'
Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity for the small businessman");
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 425-26, 429 (noting that a monopolist can
control smaller competitors' entry into market, and that the goal of Congress is to
preserve and strengthen the competitive position of small business); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962); United States v. Colonial Chevrolet
Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981). One of
the main goals of federal antitrust law, therefore, is the restraint of anticompetitive
activity in order to allow small businesses to compete.
109. Kincaid, supra note 97, at 190. Forty-three states popularly elect attorneys
general. Id.
110. Constantine, supra note 95, at 839-40; Kincaid, supra note 97, at 190-92.
111. Antitrust Implications, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Maine Deputy Attorney
General Stephen L. Wessler).
112. 21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); see California v.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989); see also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S.
253, 259-60, 263 (1937) (holding that the Sherman Act did not preclude enactment
of a local antitrust act).
113. See ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 102-06; Puerto Rico, 302 U.S. at 262-63.
114. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
1994]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
C. The Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act Do
Not Preempt State Antitrust Enforcement
Although public policy and federalism support state interven-
tion to prevent anticompetitive bank mergers, critics contend
that the BMA and the BHCA preempt state antitrust laws, re-
move state parens patriae standing to enforce federal antitrust
laws, and create a partial immunity for banks from private and
state enforcement of the antitrust laws." 6
Courts are reluctant, however, to infer federal preemption of
state law absent an express statement by Congress."" Because
Congress did not expressly preempt state antitrust enforcement
in either the BMA or the BHCA, critics of state enforcement
bear a substantial burden when arguing for preemption."8
This burden is greater when the area of law traditionally has
been regulated by the states. In such cases there is a presump-
tion against finding preemption." 9 According to the Supreme
Court, when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied
by the states, "we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress .,120
In the absence of an express statement by Congress that
state law is pre-empted, there are two other bases for finding
pre-emption. First, when Congress intends that federal law
occupy a given field, state law in that field is pre-empted.
Second, even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law
is nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible, or when state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.12" '
116. See Greene & MacDonald, supra note 10, at 507-09, 514-16.
117. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130, 132 (1978), ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. at 93, 100-01.
118. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100-01.
119. Id. at 101.
120. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
121. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
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Both antitrust'22  and banking2 ' are areas traditionally
regulated by the states. The language of the BMA and BHCA,
along with their legislative histories, establish that it was not
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state
antitrust enforcement in the area of bank mergerj.2 The
BMA and BHCA allow traditional state antitrust enforcement to
continue within the dual state-federal banking system.'25
Opponents of state use of federal antitrust laws to challenge
bank mergers also face a heavy burden when they argue that
the BMA and BHCA grant implied immunity to banks and effect
an implied repeal of the parens patriae right of state attorneys
general to enforce federal antitrust laws. "[Jmmunity from the
antitrust laws is not lightly implied,"2 ' and, accordingly, the
Supreme Court has held that "[riepeals of the antitrust laws by
implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored],
and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between
the antitrust and regulatory provisions."'27 In applying these
principles, the Court found no such repugnancy between the
BMA, the BHCA, and the federal antitrust laws. 2 ' Nor do the
BMA and BHCA reflect a regulatory scheme that is plainly re-
pugnant to state antitrust enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws.
1. The Dual State and Federal Banking System
From the earliest period of this country's history, the federal
government and the states have shared responsibility for the
regulation of banking.'29 The nation's first federal bank, the
122. See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 180-220 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 180-258 and accompanying text.
126. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967); United
States v. Philadelphia NaVl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
127. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51.
128. Id. at 350-52; see also First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. at 363-64 (holding that
an action challenging a bank merger is brought under the antitrust laws, not the
BMA).
129. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Banking Powers, the Federal
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L.
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Bank of North America, received a federal charter in 1781 and a
state charter in 1782 because of doubts about the validity of the
federal charter. 13 During the same period, states were charter-
ing and regulating their own state banks through special legisla-
tive acts. 13
1
In the mid-1800s, after the destruction of the First (1791-
1811) and Second (1816-1836) Banks of the United States, states
began to enact "free banking" laws which permitted any person
to obtain a bank charter upon the satisfaction of specified condi-
tions. 3 2 When Congress reinstituted the national bank system
in 1863, it chose to follow the state free banking model.
33
These new laws facilitated the development of a decentralized,
dual state and federal banking system.
134
In this century, Congress has repeatedly acted to preserve the
dual state-federal banking system, which allowed significant
state control, to ensure decentralization and to prevent concen-
tration of economic power. 31 State involvement in banking reg-
ulation remains important. According to the Supreme Court:
REV. 1133, 1152-55 (1990).




134. Id. at 1153-54; see also National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d
Cir. 1980) ("Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in other fields,
regulation of banking has been one of dual control since the passage of the first
National Bank Act in 1863.").
135. For example, Congress cited the need for state control over bank branching
and interstate bank acquisitions, the need for a decentralized banking system, and
the prevention of concentrated financial power as reasons for adopting and amending
the McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, in 1927 and 1933, and in passing
the Douglas Amendment in 1956. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388, 413 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 66 CONG. REC. 4437-38 (1925)
(statement of Sen. Reed)); S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. II) 3-5 (1932)
(minority views); 102 CONG. REC. 6857 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas); see also
Wilmarth, supra note 129, at 1154 n.86. The McFadden Act of 1927, codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988), prohibits national banks from branching across
state lines and allows national banks to open branches within their home states
only to the extent that state statutes expressly authorize competing state banks to
branch. The Douglas Amendment, § 3(d) of the BHCA and codified at 12 U.S.C §
1842(d) (1988), prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring banks outside of the
state in which the holding company's principle operations are located unless the
acquisition is authorized by state statute in the bank's home state.
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[B]oth as a matter of history and as a matter of present com-
mercial reality, banking and related financial activities are of
profound local concern.... [Slound financial institutions and
honest financial practices are essential to the health of any
State's economy and to the well-being of its people. Thus, it is
not surprising that ever since the early days of our Republic,
the States have.., actively regulated [banking] activ-
ities.""
6
It should be noted, however, that the dual state-federal sys-
tem of banking is not a mutually exclusive system. Rather, it is
a symbiotic system with state regulatory control over federal
banks as well as federal regulatory control over state banks. For
example, in Philadelphia National Bank,17 the Supreme Court
noted that "[sitate member and nonmember insured banks are
subject to a federal regulatory scheme almost as elaborate as
that which governs the national banks."'38 Alternatively, the
Court noted that federal banks are subject to state control in
such areas as usury, interest rates,'39 and branching.4 The
Court also recognized areas of joint state and federal regulation,
such as entry into a market and acquisitions of other banks.'
Lower courts have reiterated congressional and Supreme
Court support for a symbiotic, dual state-federal banking sys-
136. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980).
137. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
138. Id. at 327.
139. Id. at 328.
140. The Court stated that "[flurthermore, national banks appear to be subject to
state geographical limitations on branching." Id.; see also United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 610 (1974) ("[F]ederal law subjects nationally
chartered banks to the branching limitations imposed on their state counterparts.");
First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966) ("National
bank branching is limited to those States the laws of which permit it, and even
there 'only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking.'"); First Nat'l
Bank v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 325 F. Supp. 523 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (reversing
Comptroller of the Currency decision to permit federal bank to branch where Comp-
troller failed to follow all state laws in branching).
141. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 328; see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988); see
also Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944) (noting that "[tihis
Court has often pointed out that national banks are subject to state laws unless
those laws infringe the national bank laws or impose an undue burden on the per-
formance of the banks' functions").
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tern. For example, in National State Bank v. Long4 2 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "National Banks... 'are
governed in the daily course of business far more by the laws of
the State than of the nation."''' Likewise, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that "federal law does not preempt
state banking law in such vital areas as branching, interest
rates, and mergers."'
The BMA and the BHCA continue the traditional congressio-
nal respect for the dual banking system and the role of the
states in regulating bank mergers.
2. Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers-The Bank Merger
Act and Bank Holding Company Act
When Congress passed the BMA in 1960,' it was concerned
about an increasing number of bank mergers'46 and believed
that the existing controls over bank mergers were incomplete
and confusing, particularly with respect to the competitive fac-
tors involved.47 Although section 1 of the Sherman Act was
fully applicable to the banking industry, Congress concluded
that it was "of little use in controlling bank mergers."'' Con-
gress also found that section 7 of the Clayton Act was limited,
insofar as banks were concerned, to cases where a merger was
accomplished through stock acquisition.'49 Accordingly, Con-
142. 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 985 (quoting McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356 (1896)).
144. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see
United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1986) (expiaining that
the law with respect to bank mergers is not exclusively federal and the nature and
operation of the federal and state laws must be examined to determine if they can
operate compatibly); see also 12 U.S.C. § 215 (1988).
145. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
146. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995, 1996.
147. Id., reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1998; see Washington Mut. Say. Bank v.
FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that "tihere was no effective regu-
lation of bank mergers through the antitrust laws prior to 1950").
148. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 9, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2002; see also S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1959). Prior to the enact-
ment of the BMA, the only case challenging a bank merger under the Sherman Act
was brought by the Department of Justice in United States v. Firstamerica Corp.,
C.A. No. 38139 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 1959).
149. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 9, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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gress passed the BMA in 1960 to help assure vigorous compe-
tition in banking. 5 '
The BMA divided the authority to grant consent to bank
mergers between the Comptroller of the Currency (national
banks), the Federal Reserve Board (state member banks), and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (non-member, state-
insured banks). 5' The federal banking agency with jurisdiction
over a merger was required to consult with the other banking
agencies and the United States Attorney General.152 Vital con-
trol over state banks by appropriate state authorities was also
anticipated.'
The BMA also required the federal banking agencies to con-
sider several factors when deciding whether to allow a merger,
including the financial condition of the banks involved, the effect
of the proposed transaction on competition, and the convenience
and needs of the community.' Although the BMA of 1960 re-
quired the agencies to consider the effects of the merger on com-
petition, Congress did not intend the Act to affect the applicabil-
ity of the Sherman Act to bank mergers.'55
In 1963, in Philadelphia National Bank,5 ' the Supreme
Court first considered the applicability of section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act to a bank merger approved by a federal agency under
the BMA." 7 The United States Department of Justice had
challenged a consolidation of the Philadelphia National Bank
2002.
150. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1996.
151. S. REP. NO. 196, supra note 148, at 22.
152. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 12-13, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2005-07.
153. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 24; H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146,
at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2008; see infra notes 184-93 and accompa-
nying text.
154. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 9-11, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2002-04. Under the BMA of 1960, there were seven factors for the agencies to
consider: "the financial history and conditions of each bank, adequacy of capital
structure, future earnings prospects, general character of management, convenience
and needs of the community to be served, consistency of a bank's corporate powers
with the purposes of the [FDIC) Act," and the effect of the transaction on compe-
tition. Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
155. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 3.
156. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
157. Id. at 335-49.
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and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, which had been ap-
proved pursuant to the BMA by the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy.'58 The district court had held that section 7 of the Clayton
Act did not apply to bank mergers or consolidations and ap-
proved the merger.'59 The Supreme Court reversed. 6 '
The Court determined that by amending the Clayton Act in
1950, Congress intended to reach "the entire range of corporate
amalgamations," 6' including the banking industry."2  The
Court also rejected the argument that the BMA, "by directing
the banking agencies to consider competitive factors before ap-
proving mergers, immunize[d] approved mergers from challenge
under the federal antitrust laws."'6' In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court noted that the BMA did not confer express im-
munity to approved mergers. The Court also strongly disfavored
implied repeal of the antitrust laws.'64 In passing the BMA,
Congress did not embrace the view "that federal regulation of
banking [was] so comprehensive that enforcement of the anti-
trust laws would be either unnecessary, in light of the com-
pleteness of the regulatory structure, or disruptive of that struc-
ture."'65 To the contrary, the Court indicated that the legisla-
tive history did not reflect any suggestion that the "applicability
of the antitrust laws was to be affected."' 66
Philadelphia National Bank was followed by United States v.
First National Bank & Trust Co.,'67 in which the Court held
that section 1 of the Sherman Act could be used to challenge
anticompetitive bank mergers. 6 As a result of these two cas-
es, Congress became concerned that all prior bank mergers
would now be susceptible to challenge under the antitrust laws
because no statute of limitations had been set.'69 Accordingly,
158. Id. at 330-34.
159. Id. at 334-35.
160. Id. at 323.
161. Id. at 342.
162. Id. at 348.
163. Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 350-51.
165. Id. at 352.
166. Id.
167. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
168. Id. at 672-73.
169. S. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) ("The uncertainty created by
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Congress amended the BMA in 1966 to provide for a statute of
limitations. Under the 1966 amendments, all bank mergers
consummated before June 17, 1963, would become exempt from
attack under the antitrust laws, except for an action pursuant to
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
170
The 1966 amendments to the BMA also reflected a compro-
mise between those who favored exempting the banking indus-
try from antitrust laws and those who favored not granting the
banking industry any special consideration whatsoever. 7 1 Ac-
cording to the House Report on the 1966 amendments, the "in-
tended legal effect" of the amendments was to modify the BMA
in three respects:
First, it is intended to make clear that no merger which
would violate the antimonopoly section (sec. 2) of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act may be approved under any circum-
stances.
Second, the bill acknowledges that the general principle of
the antitrust laws-that substantial anticompetitive mergers
are prohibited-applies to banks, but permits an exception in
cases where it is clearly shown that a given merger is so
beneficial to the convenience and needs of the community to
be served-recognizing that effects outside the section of the
country involved may be relevant to the capacity of the in-
stitution to meet the convenience and needs of the communi-
ty to be served-that it would be in the public interest to
permit it.
Third, the bill provides that this rule of law is to be ap-
plied uniformly, in judicial proceedings as well as by the
administrative agencies."
The 1966 amendments do not change the respective duties of
the federal agencies involved in merger review.' The authori-
[the absence of a statute of limitations] is harmful to the banking industry and to
its customers."); see United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
622-23 (1957) (Burton, J., dissenting) (questioning the propriety of a suit filed in
1949 alleging Clayton Act violations based on stock acquisitions from 1917 to 1919).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966), reprinted :n 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 1860, 1860-61.
171. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1861.
172. Id. at 34, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1862.
173. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1864.
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ty to grant consent to bank mergers continues to be divided be-
tween the Comptroller of the Currency (national banks), the
Federal Reserve Board (state member banks), and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (non-member, state-insured
banks).174 The federal banking agency with jurisdiction over a
merger must consult with the other banking agencies and the
United States Attorney General.175
In contrast to the BMA of 1960, however, the effect of the
proposed merger on competition is now the preeminent consider-
ation."6 Under the BMA of 1966, the responsible agency must
use the standards set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act in
determining whether the merger will substantially lessen com-
petition.77 Any antitrust action challenging a bank merger
174. Id., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1864. The BMA was amended to include
the Office of Thrift Silpervision in the merger review process. Act of Aug. 9, 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. II, § 221, 103 Stat. 183, 266-67 (1989). 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(2) now provides:
No insured depository institution shall merge or consolidate with any
other insured depository institution or, either directly or indirectly, ac-
quire the assets of, or assume liability to pay any deposits made in, any
other insured depository institution except with the prior written approv-
al of the responsible agency, which shall be-
(A) the Comptroller of the Currency if the acquiring, assuming or
resulting bank is to be a national bank or a District bank;
(B) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the
acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a State member bank
(except a District Bank);
(C) the Corporation if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is
to be a State nonmember insured bank (except a District bank or a sav-
ings bank supervised by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision);
(D) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision if the acquiring,
assuming, or resulting institution is to be a savings association.
Id.
175. H.R. REP. No. 1221, supra note 170, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1864. Under the BHCA, the appropriate "State supervisory authority" must also be
consulted. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(b), 1849(b).
176. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1973).
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5). This section provides in pertinent part:
The responsible agency shall not approve-
(A) any proposed merger transaction which would result in a mo-
nopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspira-
cy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the business of banking in
any part of the United States, or
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any sec-
tion of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
124
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must be brought within thirty days of agency approval, and the
court is to determine the legality of the merger de novo. 78 Con-
gress also amended the BHCA in 1966 to apply the procedures
of the BMA to bank holding companies. 7 '
to create a monopoly, or to which in any other manner would be in re-
straint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.
Id.; see also United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1968); Wash-
ington Mut. Say. Bank, 482 F.2d at 463 ("The exact language of the principle anti-
trust laws was incorporated into the 1966 Act, not by coincidence, but to draw on
the seventy-five year history of their judicial construction.").
178. H.R. REP. No. 1221, supra note 170, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1865. The amended statute now provides:
Any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of a merger
transaction shall be commenced prior to the earliest time under para-
graph (6) at which a merger transaction approved under paragraph (5)
might be consummated. The commencement of such an action shall stay
the effectiveness of the agency's approval unless the court shall otherwise
specifically order. In any such action, the court shall review de novo the
issues presented.
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A).
179. S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 2385, 2394; 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c). The BMA of 1966 and the
BHCA as amended are construed to be in pari materia and are interpreted and
applied consistently with each other. First Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Chemical
Fin. Corp., 441 F. Supp. 414, 421 (W.D. Mich. 1977). The BHCA provides in perti-
nent part:
The Board shall not approve-
(A) any acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section
which would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of
any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize
the business of banking in any part of the United States, or
(B) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under
this section whose effect in any section of the country may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or which in
any other manner would be in restraint or (sic) trade, unless it finds
that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
3. State Antitrust Enforcement and Preemption Under the
BMA and BHCA
When the standards for preemption announced by the Su-
preme Court are applied to the regulation of bank mergers un-
der the BMA and BHCA, clearly Congress did not intend to
preempt state antitrust enforcement-particularly with respect
to state control over state banks. The BMA and BHCA also do
not preempt state antitrust laws with respect to federal bank
mergers; rather, they include state antitrust laws in the federal
enforcement scheme.
a. State Antitrust Enforcement and State Banks
Neither the BMA nor the BHCA contains an express state-
ment by Congress that it intended to preempt state law.50 Nor
do the statutes or their legislative histories reflect a clear and
manifest congressional intent to implement exclusive federal
control over the field of regulation of state bank mergers. To the
contrary, by specific statutory language' and through state-
ments in the legislative histories of the national banking
laws,'82 Congress clearly expressed its intention not to inter-
fere with the traditional powers of the states to control mergers
of state banks.
Historically, Congress has supported a dual state-federal
banking system and deferred to state law in mergers affecting
state banks. For example, under the national banking laws,
which were passed prior to the BMA and BHCA, Congress for-
bade national banks from merging or consolidating with state
banks if the action violated state law. 8 '
180. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c), 1841-1844, 1846-1849.
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1988); see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
182. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
183. See Act of Aug. 17, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-706, 64 Stat. 455 (codified as amend-
ed at 12 U.S.C. §§ 214, 215 (1988)). Section 214(c) provides in pertinent part that
"[n]o conversion of a national banking association into a State bank or its merger or
consolidation with a State bank shall take place under this subchapter and section
321 of this title in contravention of the law of the State in which the national bank-
ing association is located." 12 U.S.C. § 214(c). Section 215(d) provides that "no such
consolidation shall be in contravention of the law of the State under which such
bank is incorporated." 12 U.S.C. 215(d); see also Ex parte Worcester County Nat'l
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Likewise, when the BHCA was first passed in 1956,"8 it al-
lowed states to restrict federal bank holding company acquisi-
tions.'85 The BHCA reflected congressional intent that states
be permitted to restrain bank holding companies from gaining
undue control over the banking industry within their own
states.'86 Therefore, by specific statutory language, Congress
assured that the states retained their traditional power to regu-
late the formation or operation of bank holding companies with-
in their borders. According to the Senate report on the BHCA:
In any event, another provision of this bill expressly pre-
serves to the States a right to be more restrictive regarding
the formation or operation of bank holding companies within
their respective borders than the federal authorities can be or
are under this bill. Under such a grant of authority, each
State may, within the limits of its proper jurisdictional au-
thority, be more severe on bank holding companies as a class
than (1) this bill empowers the Federal authorities to be or
(2) such Federal authorities actually are in their administra-
tion of the provisions of this bill. In the opinion of the com-
mittee, this provision adequately safeguards States' rights as
to bank holding companies. 87
Thus, section 7 of the BHCA provides: "No provision of this
chapter shall be construed as preventing any State from exercis-
ing such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may here-
after have with respect to companies, banks, bank holding com-
panies, and subsidiaries thereof.")8 8
The legislative history of the BMA also reflects a congressio-
nal intent to reserve to the states their traditional role in regu-
lating state bank mergers. In passing the BMA in 1960, Con-
Bank, 279 U.S. 347, 359 (1929) ("It is very clear to us that Congress in the enact-
ment of § 3 of the Act of February 25, 1927, was anxious even to the point of repe-
tition to show that it wished to avoid any provision in contravention of the law of
the State in which the state trust company and the national bank to be consolidated
were located.").
184. Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133.
185. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1955), reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2492.
186. Id., reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2492.
187. Id., reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2492.
188. 12 U.S.C. § 1846.
19941 127
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
gress recognized that the states regulated the merger of state
banks and considered the effects on competition of a proposed
merger.' Congress explicitly stated that it expected states to
bar some state bank mergers before the mergers were even
presented to federal authorities for review.190 According to the
report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, when
passing the BMA:
In the case of every merger where the absorbing or result
bank will be a State bank, approval by the appropriate State
supervisor or other banking authority will have to be ob-
tained, in accordance with the applicable State law, before
the Federal Reserve Board or the FDIC will have an opportu-
nity to review an application under this bill.
If the State supervisor refuses his approval of the merger,
no application to the Federal Reserve Board or the FDIC
would even be considered. There is, therefore, no possibility
that the Board or the FDIC would approve a merger which
the appropriate State authorities had finally rejected.19'
Alternatively, where state banks merge, Congress intended to
permit federal authorities to eject the surviving state bank from
the Federal Reserve System and the federal deposit insurance
system if the appropriate federal authorities did not approve the
competitive aspects of the merger.'92 According to the legisla-
tive history:
The only possibility of conflict is that the Board or the FDIC
might deny an application for a merger which the State su-
pervisor had approved. This kind of conflict is not new under
189. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1993. In addition to antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general, some states
require their bank regulatory agencies to consider the competitive effects of a pro-
posed merger in the regulatory review process. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 700-711
(West 1989); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 142, 143-b, 601-b (Consol. 1982 & Supp. 1993);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604 (1967 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
342-401(a) (West Supp. 1994).
190. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2008.
191. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 24; accord H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra
note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2008.
192. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 24; accord H.R. REP. NO. 1416, supra
note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2008.
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the dual system of banking, however regrettable any specific
instance may be. Under the Board's or the FDIC's standards,
the Board may always deny membership, and the FDIC may
always deny insurance, to a State bank chartered by the
appropriate State authority. The bank may still proceed to
operate as a State-chartered bank, without membership or
without FDIC insurance, so long as the State supervisor
authorizes it to do so.'93
The explicit statutory language of the national banking laws
and the BHCA, the legislative history of these laws, and the
legislative history of the BMA of 1960, establish conclusively
that federal law does not exercise exclusive control over the field
of state bank merger regulation. Rather, the panoply of federal
banking laws shows a clear legislative intent to permit states to
control important aspects of the state banking system and,
where appropriate, to be more restrictive than federal authori-
ties in regulating their own state banking systems. Nothing in
the 1966 amendments to the BMA or the BHCA or their legisla-
tive histories suggests that Congress intended to change this
fundamental characteristic of the dual state-federal banking
system. The Third Circuit's decision in United Jersey Banks v.
Parell' supports this conclusion.
In United Jersey Banks, the plaintiff challenged the merger of
a federal bank with a bank holding company under state anti-
trust law in state court.'95 The case was removed to federal
court, but the Third Circuit ordered the case remanded to the
193. H.R. REP. NO. 1416, supra note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2008; S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 24. Whether the state bank would be
permitted to function in the state banking system may also be a function of the
nature of the disagreement between the state and federal authorities. If the bank
was the result of an anticompetitive bank merger, the merger would be barred. In
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), New Jersey state law
permitted the formation of a bank holding company that resulted in monopolization
prohibited by the Sherman Act. Id. at 327. The Court held that the state could not
authorize a restraint of trade prohibited by Congress. Id. at 346. This result is con-
sistent with the above analysis that permits more restrictive restraints on
anticompetitive conduct.
194. 783 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. First Fidelity Bancorporation v.
Parell, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
195. Id. at 362-63.
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state court system.19 The Third Circuit held that Congress al-
lowed the states considerable authority to legislate in the area of
antitrust, and, with respect to bank mergers, federal law did not
exclusively occupy the field.'97 According to the court, state
laws must operate compatibly with federal law,'98 a determina-
tion that it deemed the responsibility of the state court system
to make.'99
Under the standard set forth in United Jersey Banks, states
can and should play a role in regulating bank mergers. State
antitrust enforcement operates compatibly with the BMA and
BHCA and does not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes of Congress.""2 ' Rath-
er, state enforcement helps fulfill the congressional goals embod-
ied in the BMA and BHCA by (1) controlling undue concentra-
tion in the banking industry, (2) preserving the dual state-feder-
al banking system, and (3) allowing uniform application of anti-
trust principles to mergers of banks in the federal banking sys-
tem.
State antitrust enforcement helps fulfill the intent of Congress
because state enforcement and the BMA and BHCA have the
same principal goal-preventing anticompetitive bank mergers
from unduly concentrating the banking industry.2 °' With re-
spect to this goal of limiting undue concentration, Congress and
the courts have always permitted the states to enforce antitrust
laws against activities affecting their own states without pre-
emption. The Supreme Court's holding in Puerto Rico v. Shell
Co.2"2 reflects the rationale for this policy. According to the
Court, "[nio matter how interested the National Government
may be in prosecuting such [antitrust] offenses, instances might
occur where the latter would pass unnoticed, or where, for some
reason or other, such officers might not display the same activity
196. Id. at 370.
197. Id. at 368-69.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 369.
200. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
201. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
202. 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
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and interest that is to be expected from local officials."2 3
Even when state antitrust laws are more restrictive than
federal antitrust laws, federal courts have consistently held that
federal law does not preempt state antitrust laws because they
do not represent an obstacle to the accomplishment of the feder-
al antitrust goal of preserving competition.0 4 The courts per-
mit this result because "the fact that the Sherman Act tolerates
certain conduct does not mean that there is an affirmative feder-
al policy encouraging such conduct."205 It is appropriate to ap-
ply this principle to state bank mergers because federal anti-
trust laws do not encourage state bank mergers that are illegal
under state law.
Additionally, state antitrust enforcement with respect to state
bank mergers helps fulfill the congressional policy of respecting
and preserving the dual state-federal banking system. States
have traditionally regulated state banks and enforced antitrust
laws. Accordingly, Congress anticipated that the appropriate
state authorities might well reject proposed state bank mergers
as anticompetitive.0 5 Congress could not have intended to for-
bid national banks to merge in violation of state law but permit
state banks to do so. Nor is it plausible that in passing the BMA
or the BHCA Congress intended to force states to accept into the
state banking system banks that state authorities had concluded
were anticompetitive and illegal under state law. Such a result
would destroy an essential element of the dual state-federal
banking system that Congress has carefully sought to preserve.
Rather, permitting state antitrust enforcement in state bank
merger cases is most consistent with the dual state-federal
banking system and the principles of federalism which that
system embodies.
203. Id. at 264-65.
204. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132-33 (1978); Pinney Dock
& Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1480-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 488 U.S. 880 (1988);
Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947
(1979); W.J. Seufert Land Co. v. National Restaurant Supply Co., 511 P.2d 363, 368-
69 (Or. 1973).
205. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 126 (3d ed. 1981).
206. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 148, at 24; accord H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra
note 146, at 15, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2008.
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Finally, state antitrust enforcement is not an obstacle to the
congressional purpose of achieving uniform antitrust standards
with respect to the federal banking system-including state
member banks. The vast majority of state antitrust laws are
interpreted and enforced in harmony with federal antitrust
laws." 7 Moreover, state antitrust enforcement will never re-
quire the federal banking system, including the Federal Reserve
Board and the FDIC, to accept a state bank merger that the
appropriate federal agencies believed was anticompetitive."'
b. State Antitrust Enforcement and Federal Banks
Under the BMA of 1966, Congress did not preempt enforce-
ment of state antitrust laws in bank mergers involving federal
banks. Rather, it included state antitrust laws in the federal
enforcement scheme. The BMA of 1966 authorizes actions under
the "antitrust laws" to challenge bank mergers approved by
federal agencies.0 9 The statute also defines the "antitrust
laws" that authorize such actions: "For the purposes of this sub-
section, the term "antitrust laws" means the Act of July 2, 1890
(the Sherman Antitrust Act), the Act of October 15, 1914 (the
Clayton Act), and any other Acts in pari materia.'21°
Statutes are considered in pari materia when they have the
same purpose or relate to the same subject matter.2 ' State an-
207. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
208. In a number of reported decisions, the federal courts forbade federal agencies
responsible for reviewing proposed bank mergers from applying standards that were
more restrictive than the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Mercantile Texas Corp. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1981);
Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1973). Arguably,
these cases may indicate that state law would be preempted to the extent it applied
a standard more restrictive than federal antitrust law. Cf Vial v. First Commerce
Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,692, at 69,535-36, supplemented, 564 F. Supp.
650 (E.D. La. 1983). Such a holding would be contrary to the general principles
articulated by the courts, which permit state antitrust laws to be mor.. restrictive
than federal antitrust laws without preemption. See supra notes 34-43 and accompa-
nying text. However, such a rule would not generally cause preemption of state
antitrust laws because the vast majority of state antitrust laws are interpreted in
harmony with federal antitrust laws. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
209. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1988).
210. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(8) (1988) (emphasis added).
211. See, e.g., Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888-89 (8th Cir. 1987); In re John-
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titrust statutes are in pari materia with the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts because they have the same purpose and subject mat-
ter-the restriction of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the vast
majority of state antitrust laws must be interpreted consistently
and in harmony with federal court interpretations of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, either by state statute212 or by case
law.21 Accordingly, actions under state antitrust law may be
brought under the BMA so long as the state law is consistent
with federal antitrust law.
The court took this approach in Vial v. First Commere
Corp.,214 a state court action in which a private plaintiff chal-
son, 787 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1986).
212. See ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1412 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2113
(1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4515 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.32 (West 1988);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-3 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 740, para. 10/11 (Smith-
Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.2 (West 1987); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW II §
11-202(a)(2) (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 1 (West Supp. 1993); MICH.
COmp. LAWS ANN. § 445.784(2) (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.141 kVernon
1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-829 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:14 (1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:9-18 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-15 (Michie 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.715(2) (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-2(2)(b) (1992); S.D. COD. LAWS
§ 37-1-22 (1986); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (West 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-926 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-16 (1992).
213. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 721 n.27 (7th Cir. 1979)
(interpreting Indiana statute), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Steuer & Latham v.
National Medical Enter., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1521 (D.S.C. 1987) (interpreting
South Carolina statute), affd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); Orion's Belt, Inc. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 433 F. Supp. 301, 302 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (interpreting Indiana
statute); Ex parte Rice, 67 So. 2d 825, 829 (Ala. 1953); West v. Whitney-Fidalgo
Seafoods, Inc., 628 P.2d 10, 14 (Alaska 1981); People ex rel. Woodard v. Colorado
Springs Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 692 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Colo. 1984); People v. North Ave.
Furniture & Appliance, Inc., 645 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (Colo. 1982); Elida, Inc. v.
Harmor Realty Corp., 413 A.2d 1226, 1230 (Conn. 1979); Pope v. Intramountain Gas
Co., 646 P.2d 988, 994 n.11 (Idaho 1982); Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc., 417 N.W.2d
132, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d
1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539 (N.Y. 1988); State v. Mobile Oil Corp.,
344 N.E.2d 357, 359 (N.Y. 1976); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521, 530
(N.C. 1973); C.K. & J.K., Inc., v. Fairview Shopping Ctr., 407 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio
1980); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 587 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Okla, 1978); Tennessee
ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,558, 76,972 n.2
(Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1980); Grams v. Boss, 294 N.W.2d 473, 480 (Wis. 1980).
214. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 65,692, supplemented, 564 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. La.
1983).
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lenged a merger between the Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
a state bank, and First National Bank of Commerce, a national
bank.215 Plaintiff alleged violations of Louisiana's antitrust
laws.216 The case had been removed to federal court, and plain-
tiff filed a motion to remand."7 The court held that although
the BMA of 1966 applied to the proceeding, it did not require
the state antitrust action to be dismissed on the grounds of
preemption. Rather, according to the court, "state courts which
are asked to review a proposed merger under state antitrust
laws are required to apply the federal standards set forth in the
1966 Act."" 8 The court reached this conclusion because the
BMA explicitly permits antitrust actions based on antitrust laws
other than the Clayton Act or the Sherman Act, but which are
"in pari materia. '219 In a subsequent opinion, the court stated
that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed with his challenge to
the merger, and if he succeeded, he could cause divestiture of
the acquired bank.220
4. State Attorney General (Parens Patriae) Enforcement of the
Federal Antitrust Laws Under the BMA and BHCA
State attorneys general may use their parens patriae authori-
ty to challenge anticompetitive mergers using federal antitrust
laws because the BMA of 1966 did not impliedly repeal this
215. Id. at 69,532-33.
216. Id. at 69,533.
217. Id. at 69,535-36.
218. Id. at 69,535.
219. Id. at 69,636. Although the court recognized the right of private plaintiffs to
challenge federal mergers in state court, it also held that such actions ultimately
present federal questions and may be removed to federal court. Id. at 69,535-36. But
see United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.) (holding that antitrust
challenges under state law involving federal bank and bank holding company may
not be removed to federal court and any question of preemption must be decided by
the state court), cert. denied sub nom. First Fidelity Bancorporation v. Parell, 476
U.S. 1170 (1986).
220. In the subsequent opinion, the court denied the plaintiffs right to an auto-
matic stay under the BMA of 1966, but nevertheless held that the plaintiff was
entitled to proceed with his antitrust claim, stating, "[oln the other hand, without a
stay, plaintiffs interests are not irreparably harmed. He still has the right to pro-
ceed with his suit, and if he prevails, to cause divestiture of the merger." Vial v.
First Commerce Corp., 564 F. Supp. 650, 667-68 (E.D. La. 1983).
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right. The Supreme Court has held that "[r]epeals of the anti-
trust laws... are strongly disfavored, [sic] and have only been
found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and
regulatory provisions."22' The BMA of 1966 leaves antitrust
laws unchanged, and enforcement of these laws by state attor-
neys general is not repugnant to the BMA. Rather, the plain
language of the BMA of 1966, the legislative history of the Act,
subsequent Supreme Court and district court decisions, and
public policy support both a private right of action and state
antitrust enforcement after the BMA of 1966.
Initially, the plain language of the BMA suggests that a pri-
vate right of action remains intact:222
Any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of a
merger transaction shall be commenced prior to the earliest
time under paragraph (6) [providing a maximum of thirty
days after agency approval of the merger] at which a merger
transaction approved under paragraph (5) [a merger which
might result in a monopoly or substantially lessen competi-
tion] might be consummated.'
Because the statute does not specify any particular plaintiffs,
and because it refers to "any action brought under the antitrust
laws," the plain language of the BMA suggests that there is no
implied repeal of either a private right of action or the right of
state attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws.224
Second, the legislative history of the BMA of 1966 suggests
that Congress did not intend to amend or repeal the antitrust
laws themselves. According to Representative Paul H. Todd, Jr.:
The majority report states: "(1) The bill would establish a
single set of standards for the consideration of future merg-
ers.., under the antitrust laws.. . ," and in the section 2(d)
221. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) (foot-
note omitted).
222. According to the Supreme Court, the sole function of the courts is to enforce a
statute according to its terms when the statute's language is plain. Plain language
is not to be expanded or contracted by statements of individual legislators or com-
mittee reports. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991).
223. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
224. See Comment, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 764, 786 (1966).
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H.R. 12173 defines the antitrust laws as those now in exis-
tence. Thus, there is a clear implication that the antitrust
provisions have not been changed.2"
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have confirmed Repre-
sentative Todd's interpretation of legislative intent behind the
BMA of 1966.226 For example, in United States v. First City
National Bank,227 the Justice Department brought its action
under the antitrust laws and failed to even mention the BMA in
its complaint.22 The defendants argued that the Supreme
Court should remand the case and require the Justice Depart-
ment to allege a claim under the BMA rather than the antitrust
laws.229 The Court rejected this argument,23 holding that "an
action challenging a bank merger on the ground of its
225. H.R. REP. NO. 1221, supra note 170, at 21, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1884 (statement of Rep. Todd) (citation omitted). Examples in the legislative history
of the BMA of possible future actions by the Justice Department demonstrate the
way in which Congress envisioned the BMA would operate under the 1966 amend-
ments. See, e.g., id. at 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1860. Critics of state
antitrust enforcement use these examples to argue that Congress intended to repeal
impliedly private and state standing to enforce the antitrust laws and intended to
permit only the Justice Department to challenge bank mergers. Greene &
MacDonald, supra note 10, at 507-09. This argument ignores the historical context of
congressional action to amend the BMA. In 1960, when the BMA was passed and in
1966, when it was amended, the Department of Justice was the only party that had
ever challenged a bank merger under the antitrust laws, and at the time of the
1966 amendments, it was actively pursuing several bank merger challenges. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 1221, supra note 170, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1863;
S. REP. No. 299, supra note 169, at 2; S. REP. NO. 196, supra note 148, at 3. Nat-
urally, in this historical context, Congress would assume that the Justice Depart-
ment would be the most likely party in future bank merger challenges and, there-
fore, would use the Justice Department in any examples of how it expected the
BMA to operate. From these examples, however, one cannot simply assume that
Congress intended to repeal impliedly private and state rights of action under the
antitrust laws. Indeed, even Greene & MacDonald concede that the BMA's sponsor,
Rep. Patman, made the only reference to private rights of action in the legislative
history when suggesting that private rights of action would continue. See Greene &
MacDonald, supra note 10, at 508 n.38.
226. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 182 (1968); United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1967).
227. 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
228. Id. at 363.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 363-64.
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anticompetitive effects is brought under the antitrust laws"23'
and, therefore, the plaintiff need make no reference to the
BMA.232 According to the Court, "there is no indication [in the
statute or its legislative history] that an action challenging a
merger on the ground of its anticompetitive effects is bottomed
on the Bank Merger Act rather than on the antitrust laws."23
Rather, the Court determined that the BMA simply provided
defendants with the affirmative defense that the convenience
and needs of the community required the approval of an other-
wise anticompetitive merger.234 According to the Court, this
defense under the BMA must be pleaded and proved by the
defendants."3
In United States v. Third National Bank,"3 6 the Court reaf-
firmed the full applicability of the antitrust laws to bank merg-
ers:
We find in the 1966 Act, which adopted precisely that § 7
Clayton Act phrase ["substantially to lessen competition"], as
well as the "restraint of trade" language of Sherman Act § 1,
no intention to adopt an "antitrust standard" for bank cases
different from that used generally in the law. Only one con-
clusion can be drawn from the exhaustive legislative deliber-
ations that preceded passage of the Act: Congress intended
bank mergers first to be subject to the usual antitrust analy-
sis.237
Consistent with the Supreme Court holdings that the anti-
trust laws remain unchanged by the BMA of 1966 and the clear
language of the BMA itself, lower courts have permitted private
rights of action under federal antitrust laws challenging bank
mergers. In First Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Chemical Finan-
cial Corp.,238 a Michigan banking corporation challenged an
231. Id. at 363.
232. Id. at 363-64.
233. Id. at 364.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
237. Id. at 181-82 (citation omitted).
238. 441 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
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acquisition by Chemical Financial, a bank holding company."'
Although the court denied an automatic stay of the planned
merger, it permitted the plaintiff to proceed with an action un-
der the antitrust laws.24 According to the court:
A decision that a private lawsuit does not invoke the auto-
matic stay, however, does not foreclose a private action; it
merely means that such an action is not conducted under
shelter of an automatic stay .... Lifting the automatic stay,
however, does not mean that plaintiff cannot thereafter seek
preliminary injunctive relief. As circumstances change, the
anticompetitive impact of the proposed merger or acquisition
may become more apparent, and the resulting injury to com-
petitors may warrant judicial intervention. Certainly, should
the impact of the merger be such as to threaten plaintiffs
ability to continue to maintain the suit, this Court, provided
the other requirements for injunctive relief were met, would
not hesitate to order divestiture pending the outcome of liti-
gation.
241
Alternatively, in Southwest Mississippi Bank v. FDIC242 two
banks, which were denied the right to merge by the FDIC on the
grounds that the merger was anticompetitive, challenged that
agency's decision in a declaratory judgment action in federal
court.24 ' The district court held that because the sole issue be-
fore the court was an antitrust claim, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act did not apply, the FDIC's decision was entitled to no
presumptive weight, and the plaintiffs were entitled to full de
novo review of the antitrust issues .244 The court held that de
239. Id. at 417-20.
240. Id. at 422-23.
241. Id.; see also Vial v. First Commerce Corp., 564 F. Supp. 650, 667-68 (E.D. La.
1983).
242. 499 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
243. Id. at 2-3.
244. Id. at 5-7. This holding is consistent with United States v. First City Nat'l
Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 367 (1967), in which the Supreme Court stated:
Traditionally in antitrust actions involving regulated industries, the
courts have never given presumptive weight to a prior agency decision,
for the simple reason that Congress put such suits on a different axis
than was familiar in administrative procedure. We have found no indica-
tion that Congress designed judicial review differently under the 1966 Act
than had earlier obtained.
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novo review was appropriate under the BMA for antitrust chal-
lenges to agency approval of a merger because, "[niothing in the
language of the Act or its legislative history persuades this
Court that a different standard should apply or that the scope of
review should be different depending upon who loses or wins
before the administrative agency, where, as here, the antitrust
issue is the only issue." 5
Finally, state antitrust enforcement is not "plainly repugnant"
to the congressional purposes behind the BMA of 1966, but rath-
er helps to ensure that these purposes are achieved. As noted
above, a fundamental purpose of the BMA and BHCA is to pre-
vent undue concentration in the banking industry.246 Indeed,
the 1966 amendments to the BMA and BHCA intended to make
preserving competition in the banking industry the preeminent
goal of government enforcement and regulation.247 Historically,
Congress has sought the assistance of state attorneys general in
achieving its antitrust enforcement goals.248 Antitrust enforce-
ment efforts by state attorneys general thus help to ensure that
the congressional goal of effective antitrust enforcement re-
flected in the BMA and BHCA is achieved,249 and are certainly
not "plainly repugnant" to this congressional purpose.
A second goal of Congress in passing the 1966 amendments to
the BMA and BHCA was to achieve uniform standards in anti-
trust enforcement involving the federal banking system.25 An-
titrust enforcement by state attorneys general is essential to
achieving this goal. The regulatory system devised by Congress
requires the federal banking agencies, the Department of Jus-
tice, and the appropriate state supervisory authority to confer in
an attempt to achieve uniform enforcement standards.251 How-
ever, Congress gave the courts the ultimate authority to assure
uniformity through de novo review of agency decisions regarding
Id. (citations omitted).
245. Southwest Mississippi Bank, 499 F. Supp. at 6.
246. See supra notes 146, 186 and accompanying text.
247. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1973).
248. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 176, 186 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
251. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(4), 1842(b), 1849(b).
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proposed bank mergers."'
In practice, the federal agencies have often disagreed with
each other25  and with the courts254 on the proper antitrust
methodology for analyzing bank mergers. Where such dis-
agreements result in enforcement action by the Department of
Justice, the courts can properly fulfill their role of assuring uni-
formity.255 However, when federal agencies fail to enforce the
antitrust laws properly, or when policy changes in federal agen-
cies or the executive branch result in "rubber stamping" of pro-
posed mergers, courts are powerless on their own to fulfill their
role of ensuring uniformity over time.256 Antitrust actions
brought by state attorneys general ensure that courts may fulfill
their congressionally mandated role to enforce uniform antitrust
standards in bank merger cases where federal agencies' depar-
ture from these standards results in no enforcement action.25 '
Finally, in passing the amendments to the BMA and BHCA,
Congress intended to grant the banking industry a partial im-
munity from the antitrust laws if the merging parties could
establish that an otherwise anticompetitive merger nonetheless
served the "convenience and needs of the community.""' Be-
cause banks that defend antitrust actions brought by state at-
torneys general are free to raise the "convenience and needs of
the community" defense in the same way and to the same extent
as in an action brought by the Department of Justice, state
antitrust enforcement is not "clearly repugnant" to this congres-
sional purpose.
252. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(7), 1849(b).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 179 (1968) (Comp-
troller of the Currency disagreed with Federal Reserve Board and Department of
Justice); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 364 (1967) (same).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22, 23-24 (6th Cir.
1987) (court disagreed with Department of Justice); Mercantile Texas Corp. V Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1251, 1261 (5th Cir. 1981) (court
disagreed with Federal Reserve Board); Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482
F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1973) (court disagreed with FDIC).
255. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
258. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1967).
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D. The BMA and BHCA Create New Opportunities and
Remedies for States
The provisions of the BMA and the BHCA create new reme-
dies and enforcement opportunities for state attorneys general
who oppose proposed anticompetitive bank mergers. Among the
provisions utilized are those permitting the automatic stay of
proposed mergers, state intervention in federal enforcement
actions, and comment requirements in both statutes.
1. Automatic Stay Provisions of the BMA
The legislative history of the BMA of 1966 establishes that
when Congress passed the amendments it was deeply concerned
that successful antitrust enforcement might cause the unscram-
bling of two or more banks after their merger."9 Congress be-
lieved that such a process would be difficult and would create
serious problems for the banks' customers and the communi-
ty.6' Therefore, it provided for an automatic stay of any merg-
er approved by an agency under the BMA upon the filing of an
antitrust action."' According to the BMA:
Any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of a
merger transaction shall be commenced prior to the earliest
time under paragraph (6) at which a merger transaction
approved under paragraph (5) might be consummated. The
commencement of such an action shall stay the effectiveness
of the agency's approval unless the court shall otherwise spe-
cifically order.262
Despite the plain language of the statute, courts have consis-
tently denied automatic stays to private plaintiffs.2 6' The
courts have held that Congress intended the automatic stay
provision to apply to the United States Justice Department
259. Id. at 370-71 (discussing the legislative history of the automatic stay provi-
sions of the BMA of 1966).
260. Id.
261. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1988).
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. See, e.g., Vial v. First Commerce Corp., 564 F. Supp. 650, 666-67 (E.D. La.
1983); First Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Chemical Fin. Corp., 441 F. Supp. 414,
421-22 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
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because the provision could be used to stop "any merger, good or
bad'264 and such power should be limited to an "agency com-
mitted to acting in the public good."26 The courts reasoned
that private plaintiffs did not always act in the public interest
and that any "man on the street" could not be the intended ben-
eficiary of the extraordinary relief provided in the statute.266
Moreover, the courts concluded that because there is no bond
requirement as a condition of an automatic stay under the BMA,
Congress could not have intended such a provision to apply to
private parties.267
Although the courts' conclusions are not unjustified with re-
spect to private parties, their reasoning does not apply to state
attorneys general. To the contrary, granting state attorneys
general the right to an automatic stay not only comports with
the plain language of the statute but better fulfills the intent of
Congress.
Unlike private plaintiffs, Congress has recognized that state
attorneys general act in the public interest when instituting
antitrust actions. According to a Senate report:
[A] State attorney general is an effective and ideal spokes-
man for the public in antitrust cases. A primary duty of the
state is to protect the health and welfare of its citizens; and a
State attorney general is normally an elected and accountable
and responsible public officer whose duty it is to promote the
public interest.268
Thus, state attorneys general are different from private
plaintiffs for standing purposes when seeking relief under the
antitrust laws.269 Moreover, unlike private parties, when public
264. Vial, 564 F. Supp. at 666.
265. Id. at 667; see also First Midland Bank, 441 F. Supp. at 421-22.
266. Vial, 564 F. Supp. at 666-67; see also First Midland Bank, 441 F. Supp. at
421-22.
267. Vial, 564 F. Supp. at 667.
268. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 n.1 (1976) (discussing the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act provisions, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1988), granting state attorneys
general parens patriae authority to seek damages for state residents caused by anti-
trust violations).
269. See Pennsylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,224 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
The contours of antitrust standing as it relates to a state in its
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bodies seek injunctions in the actions on behalf of the public
good, courts may waive bonds or set bonds of nominal
amounts.27 Finally, the automatic stay provisions of the BMA
of 1966 were passed because Congress "abhorred" the unscram-
bling of banks after divestiture and feared the potential adverse
effects divestiture might have on the community."' Granting
state attorneys general this relief would better fulfill the intent
of Congress but would not create the problems associated with
granting this relief to private individuals.
2. Intervention in Pending Antitrust Challenges to Bank
Mergers
Under the BMA, state attorneys general may intervene as of
right in any antitrust action challenging a bank merger, wheth-
er brought by a private party or the government.2 The BMA
provides in pertinent part:
In any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of
[a merger transaction] approved by [a federal supervisory
agency pursuant to this subsection] ... any State banking
supervisory agency having jurisdiction within the state in-
volved, may appear as a party of its own motion and as of
right, and be represented by counsel."'
The BMA does not define "State banking supervisory agency"
and there are no court decisions interpreting this provision.
However, state attorneys general customarily represent state
agencies in most states and in some states they are authorized
parens patriae capacity are perhaps different from antitrust standing as
it applies to other private parties. Precedent involving standing of indi-
vidual private parties may not control the issue of parens patriae stand-
ing as those cases do not implicate quasi-sovereign interests. Although
the state is considered a private party, to some extent, when it brings an
action parens patriae, [there are] possible nuances between an individual
and a state which are relevant to the issue of antitrust standing.
Id. at 70,089.
270. H. Chester Horn, Jr., California v. American Stores: Some Thoughts About The
Future For State Merger Enforcement Programs, 18 NAAG Antitrust Rep. 1, 12-17
(April/May 1991).
271. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1967).
272. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(c) (1988).
273. Id.
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by statute or common law to act as unitary plaintiffs represent-
ing all government agencies." 4
This provision clearly benefits the states. There are some
instances where a state may not have the need or ability to
bring its own action to challenge a proposed merger except when
the state's interests diverge from the Department of Justice or a
private plaintiff. For example, states often agree with federal
agencies that a particular merger as structured is
anticompetitive but disagree on the nature and extent of divesti-
tures needed to make the proposed merger acceptable under the
antitrust laws."' With a right to intervene, states can ade-
quately protect their special needs and interests without expend-
ing the resources to challenge the merger on their own.
7 6
3. Regulatory Comments
Under the BMA and BHCA, the responsible federal agency
must give notice of a proposed merger and request comments
from interested parties27 and, under the BHCA, must notify
the "appropriate State supervisory authority" as well. 8 These
274. See, e.g., Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d
266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Florida ex rel. Shevin, 425 U.S.
930 (1976).
275. See Antitrust Implications, supra note 9 (testimony of Maine Assistant Attor-
ney General Steve Wessler).
276. Critics suggest that if state attorneys general had a private right of action,
then the intervention provisions of the BMA and BHCA would be meaningless.
Greene & MacDonald, supra note 10, at 507. However, states may not have the
resources, ability or need to challenge every anticompetitive bank merger that affects
them. For example, as noted above, a state may decide not to bring an action be-
cause the merger was being challenged by the Department of Justice. However, the
Department may seek divestitures with which the state disagrees, and the state may
seek intervention solely for the purpose of challenging the proposed divestitures.
Prior to the BMA of 1966, states did not have the right to intervene under such
circumstances. In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 37 F.R.D. 330 (D. Utah
1965), the court denied the State of California the right to intervene for this very
purpose. The states' right to intervene was not clearly established until after the
BMA of 1966, when the Supreme Court reversed El Paso Natural Gas, sub nom.
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
277. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(3), 1842(b) (1988); see also Martin-Trigona v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 509 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
278. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(b), 1849(b) (1988).
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provisions provide state attorneys general with an additional
opportunity to oppose an anticompetitive merger. State attor-
neys general have used these procedures successfully to block
anticompetitive aspects of a number of proposed mergers,279
without the need for litigation in state or federal court.28
III. CONCLUSION
Ongoing bank mergers and the related increase in concentra-
tion in the banking industry substantially impact states' econo-
mies, businesses, and people. Traditional antitrust enforcement
by state attorneys general protects states' vital interests and is
consistent with long established principles of federalism. Accord-
ingly, the BMA and BHCA do not preempt state antitrust en-
forcement and do not impliedly repeal the right of state attor-
neys general to enforce parens patriae federal antitrust laws.
279. See supra note 9.
280. The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to an antitrust action chal-
lenging a proposed bank merger, and the district court decides all such challenges
de novo. See, e.g., United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 367-69
(1967); Southwest Miss. Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp. 1, 5-8 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
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